📚

All Subjects

🏛

AP Latin

🥊

Unit 6

6.2 Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I, Chapters 27-29

7 min read•june 18, 2024

hunter_borg

AP Latin 🏛

24 resources

See Units

How to use this Study Guide:

Use this study guide as a refresher after instruction from your professional Latin instructor/teacher. As it is AP Latin, you will be expected to learn the grammar in class except for questions which we will go over again. The main purpose of this study guide is to provide 80% literal, 20% interpretative translations and to break down the text, context, and grammar. What interpretative means is that it is not the literal Latin translation but that it has been restructured in some way to better fit the modern English vernacular.

Comentarii de Bello Gallico, Book 5, Chapters 27-29

Original Passage

[

] 1 Mittitur ad eos colloquendi causa Gaius Arpineius, eques Romanus, familiaris Quinti Tituri, et Quintus Iunius ex Hispania quidam, qui iam ante missu Caesaris ad Ambiorigem ventitare consuerat; apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: 2 Sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuesset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius ab Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud se in servitute et catenis tenuissent; 3 neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. 4 Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. 5 Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. 6 Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. 7 Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem offici pro beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. 8 Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. 9 Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab eis absit. 10 Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. 11 Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre. Hac oratione habita discedit Ambiorix.

[

] 1 Arpineius et Iunius, quae audierunt, ad legatos deferunt. Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non neglegenda existimabant maximeque hac re permovebantur, quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum. 2 Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaque inter eos exsistit controversia. 3 Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantasvis [magnas] copias etiam Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?

[

] 1 Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam; 2 neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. 3 Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; 4 ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris exstincta. 5 Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? 6 Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. 7 Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.

Questions about the Latin

1. What is the subject of the sentence in Chapter 27, "Sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere"?

2. What is the verb of the sentence in Chapter 28, "Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non neglegenda existimabant"?

3. What is the object of the sentence in Chapter 29, "Brevem consulendi esse occasionem"?

4. What is the adverb modifying in the sentence in Chapter 27, "Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre"?

5. What is the adjective modifying in the sentence in Chapter 28, "quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum"?

Answers about the Latin

1. Ambiorix

2. existimabant

3. occasionem

4. faciat

5. ignobilem, humilem

Translation

Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q.

Titurius, and with him, Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already

on previous occasions, had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's

mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them Ambiorix

spoke to this effect: "That he confessed, that for Caesar's kindness toward

him, he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he had been

freed from a tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci,

his neighbors; and because his own son and the son of his brother had been

sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci

had detained among them in slavery and in chains; and that he had not done

that which he had done in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by

his own judgment or desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that

his government was of that nature, that the people had as much authority

over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the

war was this - that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the

Gauls; that he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he

was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces

he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution

of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar's winter-quarters,

in order that no legion should be able to come to the relief of another

legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially when a measure

seemed entered into for recovering their common freedom. Since he had performed

his duty to them on the score of patriotism [he said], he has now regard

to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed

Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to consult for his and his soldiers'

safely; that a large force of the Germans had been hired and had passed

the Rhine; that it would arrive in two days: that it was for them to consider

whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to lead

off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero

or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the

other rather more; that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he

would give them a safe passage through his territories; and when he did

that, he was both consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved

from the winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his

obligations."

Chapter 28

Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had heard.

They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things were

spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be disregarded; and

they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely

credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to

make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they refer

the matter to a council, and a great controversy arises among them. L.

Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of

the first rank, were of opinion "that nothing should be done hastily, and

that they should not depart from the camp without Caesar's orders;" they

declared, "that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be encountered

by fortified winter-quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it]; that

they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting

many wounds upon them; that they were not distressed for corn; that in

the mean time relief would come both from the nearest winter-quarters and

from Caesar; lastly, they put the query, "what could be more undetermined,

more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting the most important

affairs on the authority of an enemy?"

Chapter 29

In opposition to those things, Titurius exclaimed, "That they would

do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction with

the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster had been received

in the neighboring winter-quarters; that the opportunity for deliberating

was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the

Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying Tasgetius,

nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the camp with

so great defiance of us; that he did not regard the enemy, but the fact,

as the authority; that the Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus

and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans;

that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many defeats she

was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military

matters being extinguished." Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this,

that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds?

That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very

formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all

Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in dispatch. What

issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have?

from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine,

by a protracted siege, was."

Translation Sourced From http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.5.5.html

Wrapping these lines up:

Remember that despite these lines being a dry read, they describe the thought processes' of one of the greatest men in terms of power and influence in Roman history. Keep that in mind as you are moving forward.

Browse Study Guides By Unit

🔥Unit 3 – Vergil, Aeneid, Book 2

🏇Unit 4 – Caesar, Gallic War, Book 4

👑Unit 5 – Vergil, Aeneid, Book 4

☠️Unit 8 – Vergil, Aeneid, Books 6, 8, & 12

⚔️Unit 1 – Vergil, Aeneid, Book 1

🥗Unit 2 – Caesar, Gallic War, Books 1 & 6

🥊Unit 6 – Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I

6.0Unit 6 Overview: Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I

6.1Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I, Chapters 24-26

6.2Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I, Chapters 27-29

6.3Caesar, Gallic War, Book 5, Part I, Chapters 30-32